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Abstract
Background: Organizational reforms of hospitals in Iran are mainly aimed at improving efficiency, reducing
government spending on health care, and improving the quality of services. These reforms began with hospital
autonomization and have continued with other initiatives such as formation of board of trustees, independent and
corporatized hospitals.
Objective: The purpose of this scoping review was to summarize and compare the results of studies conducted on
organizational reform of hospitals in Iran to paint a more clear picture of the status quo by identifying knowledge
gaps, inform policymakers, and guide future studies and policies.
Method: This review’s methodology was inspired by Arksey and O’Malley’s methodological framework to examine
the extent, range, and nature of research activity about organizational hospital reforms in Iran. A literature search
was performed using PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar for English papers as well as SID,
IranDoc, Magiran, and the Social Security Research Institute Database for Persian papers from 1991 to April 2020.
Results: Twenty studies were included in the review. Studies were grouped by the types of organizational reform,
study’s objective, setting, methodology, data collection and analysis techniques, and key findings. Thematic construction
was used based on the types of organizational reform to present a narrative account of existing literature.
Conclusions: The autonomy granted to the hospitals was unbalanced and paradoxical in terms of key effective
dimensions. Poor governance and regulatory arrangements, low commitment to corporate governance, Inappropriate
board composition, weak internal controls, unsustainable financing and inefficient payment mechanisms, poor interaction
with stakeholders and ignoring contextual factors have been cited as the main reasons for the failure of organizational
reforms in Iran. The limited use of evidence and research was obvious at different stages of policymaking, especially in the
policy formulation phase and evaluation of its results.
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Introduction
Governments around the world are implementing health
reforms, in order to cope with issues like rising costs,
user dissatisfaction with services, and problems that are
often associated with public hospitals such as technical
and allocation inefficiencies, low productivity, non-ac-
countability to patients, waste, fraud, and corruption [1].
While privatization seems to be a good solution to the
problems of public hospitals, many countries are reluctant
to pursue it for a variety of reasons. First, privatization
may lead people to think that the government is not hon-
oring its obligations to provide healthcare to its popula-
tion. Second, public ownership of hospitals may seem to
be a better alternative for achieving objectives other than
efficiency and quality improvement. The third reason is
the failure of many privatization attempts in low- and
middle-income countries [2].
Healthcare and hospital care sectors are different from
other industries and should be regulated by the govern-
ment to ensure universality, equity and accessibility for
all, and cost-effectiveness without wasting resources [3].
As a result, many countries are pursuing organizational
reforms of public hospitals as an alternative. These re-
forms are often called autonomization or corporatization
and commonly involve maintaining public ownership of
hospitals while transforming them into a more independ-
ent entity responsible for their performance. In other
words, the structures, incentives, and competitiveness of
the private sector are applied to public hospitals with the
expectation that market pressures will result in better per-
formance outcomes, higher efficiency, and quality [2].
Views about the role of the state in socioeconomic devel-
opment have changed in recent years, and organizational
hospital reforms are a major example of that [4]. In Iran,
these reforms have been a function of the domestic and
international macroeconomic contexts. Following global
trends and using 5-year development plans, the Iranian
government has been applying the principles of new
public management, including downsizing, managerialism,
decentralization, de-bureaucratization, and privatization
[5, 6]. The health sector has also undergone these reforms
and various policies have been developed and imple-
mented to improve hospital performance. These include
widespread managerial, technological, financing (budget-
ing and payment), and organizational reforms [7].
The Ministry of Health and Medical Education
(MOHME) and the Social Security Organization (SSO)
as the most important and the largest healthcare pro-
viders in Iran have implemented various initiatives
aimed at organizational hospital reform. The majority of
hospitals in Iran are budgetary or traditional public hos-
pitals. These hospitals are usually run bureaucratically
by a chairman and manager. These hospitals are part of
the government and the hospital manager is necessarily
an “administrator”. They have limited decision-making
power over the human, physical, and financial resources
and strategic management of the hospital, and are often
controlled through government hierarchies, laws, and
regulations. The purpose of organizational reform is to
give these hospitals some degree of management auton-
omy. Hospital autonomization, board of trustees (BT)
hospitals, and independent hospitals policy in hospitals
affiliated with the MOHME and corporatization of hos-
pitals affiliated with the SSO are some of the most im-
portant policies that have been implemented in the
Iranian health system, characterized by the common
themes of decentralization and downsizing of the public
sector.
The central question of this research is: What is
known from the existing literature about organizational
hospital reforms in Iran, and what are the main factors
that lead to the failure of reforms? Some various studies
and reports have examined different aspects of these
policies and the purpose of the present research is to
clarify the existing body of research evidence on
organizational hospital reforms in Iran. The major find-
ings of the studies retrieved and included are summa-
rized to draw a complete picture of the status quo to
inform policymakers and researchers. Finally, knowledge
gaps are identified to guide future studies.
Methods
Eligibility criteria
This review is based on the methodological approach of
Arksey and O’Malley [8] to examine the extent, range,
and nature of research activity about hospital
organizational reforms in Iran, including the develop-
ment of autonomous, board of trustee, independent, and
corporate hospital policies in Iran. Peer-reviewed papers
and the grey literature (government reports, policy docu-
ments, reports of consultants, unpublished reports, etc.)
between 1991 and April 2020, written in English and
Persian, were included. Databases of ongoing research
and unpublished literature were also searched.
Information sources
A literature search was performed using PubMed,
Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar for English
papers as well as SID, IranDoc, Magiran, and the Social
Security Research Institute Database for Persian papers
and gray literature. Ongoing research and unpublished
literature were also included. A Google search with no
date restrictions was also conducted and only the first
200 hits (as sorted by relevance by Google) were
screened. The search strategies were drafted by an expe-
rienced researcher (LD) and further refined through
team discussion. The search strategy for PubMed is pre-
sented in Table 1. The final search results were exported
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into EndNote and duplicates were removed. A keyword
search strategy was employed using the terms
“organizational reform”, “autonomy”, “corporate”, “board of
trustees” and “hospital” in English databases and Persian
equivalents of these terms including “ESLAHAT-SAZE-
MANI”, “KHODGARDAN OR MOSTAGHEL”, “SHER-
KATI OR HEYAT-MODIRE”, “HEYAT-OMANA” and
“BIMARESTAN” were used for searching in Persian
databases.
Selection of sources of evidence
Search results were exported to EndNote X8 reference
manager software (Thomson Reuters, Philadelphia, PA,
USA) and duplicates were removed. The title and abstract
of the articles were independently reviewed by two au-
thors (RS and LD) to screen for eligibility. Articles meet-
ing the inclusion criteria underwent two full-text
independent reviews by two authors (RS and LD). In case
of disagreements, a third-party reviewer (MJ) would be
consulted. Finally, the reference lists of all of the included
studies were checked for additional relevant studies.
Data charting process
Two team members (RS and LD) involved in the review
study protocol development independently extracted
data from two studies and met to compare their data en-
tries. The final version of the data extraction form was
sent via email to team members and modified as re-
quired based on feedback from the team.
Subsequently, each included study was abstracted by
one team member (RS), and verified by a second re-
viewer team (LD, HJ and, JM). As an additional data
cleaning step, a third reviewer team (MJ, ST and, NLB)
verified all the changes made by the second reviewer to
ensure data accuracy. Once all studies had been checked
for accuracy in a detailed table, a summary table was
created for publication using Microsoft Word 2016. The
extracted data included report characteristics (e.g., first
author, year of publication, publication type, report de-
sign), type of organizational reform policies, as well as
key findings and implemented policies. All authors
reviewed and edited the manuscript and approved the
final draft of the manuscript.
Critical appraisal of individual sources of evidence
As per guidance on conducting scoping reviews and
consistent with scoping reviews on health-related topics,
the methodological quality of the included reports was
not appraised [9].
Synthesis of results
The studies were grouped by the types of organizational
reform, study objective, setting, methodology, data collec-
tion techniques, and key findings. Also thematic construc-
tion was used based on types of organizational reform to
present a narrative account of existing literature.
Results
Twenty studies were included in this review. Figure 1 out-
lines the flow of studies through the inclusion process and
Table 2 describes the included studies. Most studies were
published articles (16/20; 80%). Most of them were pub-
lished between 2011 and 2015 (12/20; 60%). There has been
only one published study over the period of 10 years after
the implementation of the first major policy for
organizational hospital reform in Iran, and only two studies
15 years after its implementation. Most studies have fo-
cused on BT hospital policy (10/20; 50%), while hospital
corporatization policy has been studied the least (3/10;
15%). There are no studies on the new independent hos-
pital policy as its implementation has been ongoing since
2017 and is yet to be fully established. Most studies were
conducted in Tehran (4/20; 20%) and Isfahan (4/20; 20%)
and most of them were qualitative (10/20; 50%). Most stud-
ies were written in English (12/20; 60%), with Mehdi Jafari
as the first author of 5 articles (25%) and Leila Doshmangir
as the first author of 3 articles (15%), being among the most
influential researchers in the area of organizational hospital
reforms in Iran.
Table 3 provides the characteristics of published stud-
ies on organizational hospital reforms in Iran. In the
next section, the results of these studies are examined
using Preker and Harding’s conceptual framework and
based on the degree of autonomy granted to public
hospitals.
Table 1 Search strategy summary for the scoping review
Inclusion criteria • Publication years 1991–2020
• Peer-reviewed publications, gray literature, government reports, reports of consultants, policy documents,
unpublished reports
• English and Persian language; focused on hospital autonomy in Iran
Exclusion criteria • Editorials/commentaries, letters, conference abstracts
• Papers focused on privatization or public-private partnerships
PubMed search string
(final version)
• Search (((((((((((((((((“organizational reform”) OR autonomy [Abstract]) OR autonomization [Abstract]) OR
autonomisation [Abstract]) OR corporate [Abstract]) OR corporatization [Abstract]) OR corporatisation [Abstract])
OR corporation*[Abstract]) OR decentralization [Abstract]) OR decentralisation [Abstract]) OR board of
trustees*[Abstract]) OR board of directors*[Abstract]) AND hospital) AND Iran)))))
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Hospital autonomization policy
Organizational hospital reforms in Iran began in 1995
with the issuance of guidelines by the MOHME for new
hospital administration called the fee-for-service plan.
According to these guidelines, which became known as
the hospital autonomization plan, public hospitals were
allowed to generate revenues from cash payments and
insurance premiums, thus reducing their dependence on
government budgets. Despite the attempts by stake-
holders to continue the plan, especially by the Planning
and Budgeting Organization, it faced opposition by both
the MOHME and the Parliament and was terminated in
1996 following the approval of a plan for financing the
salaries of hospital staff from the government budget.
Fig. 1 PRISMA flow diagram for included studies
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Jafari et al. [11, 12] conducted two studies to deter-
mine the key organizational dimensions that influence
the autonomy of public hospitals using World Bank’s
organizational reform model and assessed the degree of
autonomy granted to the hospitals based on these di-
mensions. In the first step, nine themes representing key
organizational elements were identified, including deci-
sion rights in “strategic”, “human resources”, “financial”
and “physical resources” management, “product” and
“procurement” market exposure, “residual claimant”,
“governance arrangements and accountability mecha-
nisms”, and “social functions”. In the next step, they
assessed the degree of autonomy granted to the hospitals
on the basis of these nine themes through interviews
with 32 senior managers. The results indicated very lim-
ited decision right in “strategic”, “human resources” and
“physical resources” management. Hospitals were
allowed to generate revenue (fee-for-service) but were
not the sole residual claimants. In addition, hospitals
were exposed to the product market but were limited in
the procurement market (payment ceiling). Hierarchical
and financial accountability were the main accountability
mechanisms. Several insurance programs and the gov-
ernmental budget were used to protect poor people. The
results of these studies indicate that hospital autonomi-
zation was unbalanced and inconsistent. More decision
rights in “strategic” and “human resources” management
and higher procurement market exposure should be
granted. Also, the hospital should be the sole residual
claimant. The government needs a regulatory and ac-
countability mechanism to ensure high hospital perform-
ance outcomes and balance revenue generation and
social objectives.
Another study by Doshmangir et al. [20] describes and
assesses the development and implementation of the
hospital autonomization policy to understand the inten-
tions and motivations of policymakers, general outcomes
of the policy, and the reasons behind the perceived fail-
ure to achieve its intended objectives. The findings indi-
cate that stakeholders of the policy had different and
conflicting objectives, which resulted in an unsatisfactory
implementation process. This policy led to long-lasting
and often negative changes in the hospital sector and the
entire Iranian health system. Hospital autonomization
appeared to be an ill-advised policy to remedy the ineffi-
ciency problems in low socioeconomic areas of the
country. The idea that hospital autonomization would
necessarily result in a better health system may be a false
assumption, as its success relies on many contextual,
structural, and policy implementation factors.
Two quantitative studies have studied the effect of au-
tonomy policy on hospital performance. Amiri [10] ex-
amined the effect of autonomy on the performance
indicators of 5 teaching hospitals before and after the
implementation of the autonomy policy and its results
indicated the policy failed to meet the expected objec-
tives to improve service quality and efficiency. Ahmadi
[17] investigated the effect of autonomy policy on
Table 2 Description of included studies
Variables n (%)
Publication type
Journal article 16 (80)
Thesis 2 (10)
Organizational report 1 (5)








Autonomization policy 6 (30)
BT policy 10 (50)
Corporatization policy 3 (15)







Two or more provinces 4 (20)









Mehdi Jafari 5 (25)
Leila Doshmangir 3 (15)
Arash Rashidian 3 (15)
Iravan Masoudi Asl 3 (15)
Amirhossein Takian 3 (15)
Mohammad Arab 3 (15)
Hamid Ravaghi 2 (10)
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Table 3 Characteristic of included studies in the scoping review in the order of publication date
First Author, Year Publication Type,
Policy
Study Objective Setting Methodology, Data
Collection
Amiri 1997 [10] Thesis, autonomization
policy
• Investigating the effect of
hospital autonomy on
performance indicators
before and after the





- Data collection forms (data
on performance indicators of
5 teaching hospitals)
- Review of 410 medical
records to evaluate the rate
of readmissions due to
surgical site infections
Jafari 2008 [11] Article, autonomization
policy
• Identifying key organizational
dimensions that influence
the autonomy of university
hospitals and the level of
autonomy granted in each
dimension
6 hospitals (Tehran) • Qualitative
- Semi-structured interview
with 27 hospital managers
Jafari 2011 [12] Article, autonomization
policy
• Assessing the views of senior
managers in selected
hospitals on the degree of
autonomy granted to the
hospitals
6 hospitals (Tehran) • Qualitative
- 4 initial in-depth interviews
and 27 semi-structured inter-
view with hospital managers
Sajadi 2012 [13] Article, board of trustees
policy
• Examining the effect of BT
policy on hospital efficiency
1 hospital (Isfahan) • Mixed method (A quasi-
experimental retrospective
and qualitative case study)
- Performance indicator data
were extracted from the
hospital’s statistical
information resources
- Interviews with seven experts
in the field (three national
policymakers, two local
managers, and two hospital
administrators)
Manavi 2012 [14] Article, board of trustees
policy
• Estimating the financial
impact of implementing the










and estimation of total costs)
Gholipour 2013 [15] Article, board of trustees
policy
• Comparing performance






• Quantitative, a retrospective
longitudinal study
• Study variables included:
average length of stay
(ALOS), bed occupancy rate
(BOR), and bed turnover ratio
(BTR). The data were




units during the period
2010–2012




hospitals according to World
Bank’s organizational reform
model (Preker Model) in
Isfahan
2 BT hospital (Isfahan) • Qualitative
• Semi-structured interviews
with top managers of se-
lected hospitals
Ahmadi 2014 [17] Article, autonomization
policy
• Investigating the effect of
autonomization policy on
patient satisfaction (as an





- Data were collected before
and after implementation of
the autonomization policy
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Table 3 Characteristic of included studies in the scoping review in the order of publication date (Continued)
First Author, Year Publication Type,
Policy






Article, board of trustees
policy
• Exploring the obstacles and
barriers that lead to the
failure of hospital
autonomization (BT policy)
reform and their mechanisms
All 54-university hospi-




- Data collection was done
within 2 phases: (1) 276
unstructured questionnaires
inquiring key informants of
barriers, and (2) 23 semi-
structured interviews with
key informants.
Meshki 2014 [19] Article, hospital
autonomization policy
• Determining the relationship
between the autonomy
policy and public hospitals’
performance
5 hospitals (Gilan) • Quantitative (survey study)
- 48 questionnaire completed
by accounting staff,
managers, and physicians.
Doshmangir 2015 [20] Article, autonomization
policy
• Developing a policy map
that includes important dates
and events leading to the
policy process milestones
• Understanding intentions
and motives of policymakers,
general outcomes of the
policy, and the reasons
behind the perceived failure
in achieving the intended
objectives
• Drawing broader lessons















- Content analysis of
parliamentary sessions’
transcripts, policy documents,
gray literature and published
papers and articles including
472 policy documents






involved in or were affected
by the development and
implementation of the policy
Doshmangir 2015 [21] Article, board of trustees
policy
• Exploring the perceptions
and views of expert
stakeholders as to why the
BT policy did not achieve its
perceived objectives
• Providing an in-depth under-
standing of the implementa-







trustees, and health care
providers
• Qualitative
- 47 semi-structured face-to-
face interviews and two
focus group discussions (in-
volving 8 and 10 participants,
respectively) and analysis of a
comprehensive set of rele-
vant documents
Masoudi Asl 2015 [22] Article, board of trustees
policy
• Comparing performance












and patients and staff
satisfaction) was collected
during the years 2011 to
2013 using standard lists and
questionnaires












- Data was collected using
hospital information system
(HIS) and statistical reports
sent by corporate hospitals
and the Province’s Health
Administration
Mehrolhassani 2017 [24] Article, board of trustees
policy
• Determining the allocation of




• Qualitative study-case study
- Review of documents, two
in-depth interviews and five
focus group discussions with
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Table 3 Characteristic of included studies in the scoping review in the order of publication date (Continued)
First Author, Year Publication Type,
Policy
Study Objective Setting Methodology, Data
Collection
eleven experts). Participants
were members of the board
of trustees and representa-
tives of the financial depart-
ment (
Zahmatkesh 2017 [25] Thesis, hospital
autonomization policy
and board of trustees
policy
• Exploring the extent to
which hospital middle
managers can exercise
autonomy in England and
Iran
• Explaining the impact of
public management reforms
on middle managers and
their response to these
reforms
2 first-wave applicants
for FT status in England,
and 2 public hospitals in
Iran (Isfahan) that have
become BTs
• Qualitative (Comparative case
study)
- Face-to-face semi-structured




Jafari 2018 [26] Article, board of trustees
policy
• Identifying the barriers in









- The survey forms were
officially mailed to
participants. Then, it was
followed up by phone calls
for further description. The
survey form had 2 main
questions describing the
barriers and proposing the
solution
Doshmangir 2019 [7] Article, hospitals
autonomy policy and
board of trustees’ policy




within the Iranian health















were collected from various
sources mentioned in
setting)
Mohammadi 2019 [27] Article, corporatization
policy
• Identifying and explaining








• Mixed methods (qualitative
and quantitative study)
- Literature review and an
interview with 15 key




• Questionnaire completed by
405 staff, line managers, and






• Comparing public, private,
corporate, and budgetary
hospitals in terms of
performance indicators
• Qualitative evaluation of the
current structure of hospital
governance
• Providing a model for
reforming the structure of






• Mix method (qualitative and
quantitative study). Data
collected using:
- Input, throughput, and
output indicators collected
by data collection sheet, HIS,
facility-level statistical reports,
and medical records
- Likert-based leadership style
questionnaire
- Inpatient and outpatient
satisfaction survey
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inpatient satisfaction as one indicator of service quality
before and after implementation of autonomy policy
using questionnaires based on the SERV-QUAL model.
This study showed that the implementation of autonomy
policy had a significant effect on patient satisfaction.
Another quantitative study by Meshki [19] examined
the relationship between autonomy policy and perform-
ance from the perspective of 55 Executive and Account-
ing Managers and Clinical staff in 5 hospitals affiliated
to Gilan University of Medical Sciences. The results of
the study showed that there was a significant relation-
ship between autonomy policy and financial perform-
ance, but poor implementation of the autonomy policy
led to failure to achieve its goals.
Board of trustees hospital policy
The first wave of organizational hospital reforms began
with the hospital autonomization policy and entered a
new phase as a result of the failure to achieve its objec-
tives and in line with the Fourth and Fifth National
Development Plans. The new phase involved the devel-
opment of board of trustees (BT) hospitals. According to
Article 88 of the National Fourth Development Plan
(2005–2009), the MOHME is required to take measures
to increase productivity and make optimal use of na-
tional healthcare resources. Paragraphs B and C of this
article highlight the need for customer focus in health-
care centers, reforms of management processes and
structures, and having hospitals governed by board of
trustees with established tariffs [29].
Paragraph D of Article 32 of the Fifth Development
Plan also emphasizes the establishment of board of
trustees in teaching hospitals. This initiative is supported
in annual national budgets. According to the guidelines
on administration of BT hospitals, the main objectives of
this policy are continuous improvement of quality of
care, enhancement of clinical care, increasing productiv-
ity, timely provision of services, and increasing patient
satisfaction as well as establishment of employee per-
formance management, operational budgeting, outsour-
cing, maintenance management, comprehensive hospital
information and management systems. This policy was
implemented in 2005 and is still ongoing [30].
The main difference between these hospitals and the
autonomous hospitals of 1995 is that BT hospitals are
not subject to financial and trade regulations and are ad-
ministered by a board of trustees. The boards of trustees
consists of the following members: the chancellor of the
medical university, the hospital president (secretary of
the board), a health management expert, two faculty
members, a representative from charitable organizations,
and a mayor or a member of the municipality [21].
Ferdosi et al. [16] conducted a study to identify the
stakeholders and the accountability system of two BT
hospitals in Isfahan. The results of interviews with eight
senior managers showed that despite the emphasis on
the presence of representatives from civil societies such
as the municipality in the board of trustees, their pres-
ence was limited and there was virtually no significant
change in the accountability system.
Markazi Moghaddam et al. [18] studied the obstacles
and barriers to the implementation of the BT hospitals
policy. Nine obstacles were identified, including “board
structure and composition”, “delays in the announce-
ment of BT hospitals’ tariffs by the MOHME”, “Lack of
commitment by insurance organizations and the
MOHME to agreements regarding the financing of BT
hospitals”, “Poor follow-up on BT policy implementa-
tion”, “irregular board meetings”, “absence of external
overseers”, “shortage of full-time physicians”, “lack of
management stability”, and “insurance organizations’ de-
layed payments”. The results suggest that unsustainable
financing of this policy and the resulting financial bur-
den on the MOHME, and insurance organizations are
the most important barriers to its success, as these orga-
nizations have been unable to fulfill what they had
agreed upon obligations. Changes in insurance organiza-
tions following a change in government and renegotiat-
ing on agreements by new officials is another factor that
could contribute to the failure of the policy. Delayed an-
nouncement of tariffs for BT hospitals by the MOHME
is likely due to the government’s concern about finan-
cing its costs. The appointment of the university chan-
cellor as the chair of the board indicates the reluctance
of the government to grant greater autonomy to BT hos-
pitals and signals its attempts to control them through
various mechanisms, thus hindering the implementation
of this policy. Moreover, the results of this study showed
that there were also some contextual factors that chal-
lenge the success of the BT hospital policy, including
dual practice that prevents full-time employment of phy-
sicians in these hospitals.
Doshmangir et al. [21] explored the views of expert stake-
holders on the reasons for the perceived failure of the BT
hospital policy to achieve its objectives. The results showed
that the attempts by MOHME to maintain its authority, the
inability of hospitals to use the granted autonomy, unsus-
tainable financing, poor interaction with stakeholders, not
considering the context of the policy, and absence of
evidence-based policymaking were the most important fac-
tors contributing to the failure of the policy. The results
also suggested that the full implementation of the policy,
especially some of its key aspects such as financing, could
contribute to the achievement of its expected goals.
The results of Mehrolhassani et al. [24] on resource al-
location in a BT hospital showed that most decisions are
made by the chair of the board of trustees and the ex-
ecutive director and that there is no systematic and
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transparent process for decision making about various
issues and priorities. Members of the board of trustees
do not play a significant role in making decisions and
policies or setting strategies, but rather have a more
prominent monitoring role and only report mainly con-
cerning the performance outcomes of the hospital.
There are no clear criteria for the allocation of re-
sources, and payments are mainly made based on the
hospital’s needs. Moreover, political pressures from
higher authorities also have a significant effect on re-
source allocation. For instance, interest groups could
pressure the hospital to purchase laboratory equipment
through the department of treatment. In addition, the
results of this study indicated that financial issues and
challenges of the hospital affect decision making and
may lead to the transfer of the financial burden to the
patients.
Zahmatkesh [25] examined the degree of autonomy
granted to hospital middle managers in England and
Iran. She found that their autonomy is constrained in
both countries. In England, middle managers have suffi-
cient financial and human resources but have to adhere
to government policy and targets. Iranian middle man-
agers are not as constrained by government policy and
targets but do not have the financial and human re-
sources necessary to exercise their autonomy. In both
countries, the central government control is a major fac-
tor and affects the autonomy of hospital middle
managers.
In a qualitative study, Jafari et al. [26] identified the
barriers to implementing the BT hospital policy. These
barriers are classified into 9 categories, including prob-
lems related to implementation regulation, financial
problems in policy implementation, problems related to
faculty members, the ambiguity of implementation regu-
lations, problems related to the BTs, authority level, hos-
pital structure, the quality and quantity of hospital
human resources, and the fee-for-service system. This
study finds that “implementation regulations” and “fi-
nancial problems” constitute over 50% of the barriers.
Partial implementation of the policy and insufficient
budget are identified as the most critical factors hinder-
ing the implementation of the BT hospital policy.
Doshmangir et al. [7] conducted a comprehensive
document analysis and publications review to describe
and interpret the major health policy initiatives includ-
ing the trend towards organizational reforms in public
hospitals during the past four decades in Iran. In this
study, the process of organizational reforms in hospitals
is briefly described.
Four studies [13, 14, 15, 22] have been carried out to
examine the effect of the BT hospital policy on hospital
performance outcomes. Sajadi et al. [13] conducted a
quasi-experimental retrospective case study to explore
the effect of this policy on hospital efficiency three and a
half years before and after implementation. Bed occu-
pancy rate (BOR), average length of stay (ALOS), and
hospital income were selected as measures of hospital ef-
ficiency, and data were analyzed using interrupted time
series analysis. The results showed that the BT hospital
policy did not increase hospital efficiency. Gholipour
et al. [15] carried out a retrospective longitudinal study
to compare performance indicators (BOR, ALOS, and
BTR) of two gynecology hospitals with different forms of
organizational governance (budgetary/BT hospitals).
Using the Pabon Lasso model, the results indicated bet-
ter performance in the BT hospital compared to the
budgetary hospital. Masoudi Asl et al. [22] conducted a
cross-sectional study to compare performance indicators
(quality management, safety, medical equipment man-
agement, and patients and staff satisfaction) in the same
settings as the previous study. Variables were weighted
through hierarchical analysis (AHP) and were analyzed
in SPSS 17 and Expert Choice. Among the five variables,
safety had the highest weight and medical equipment
management had the lowest weight. On a scale of 0 to
100, the performance score of the BT hospital was 33.08
and the score of the budgetary hospital was 29.52. Thus,
no statistically significant association was found between
organizational structure and performance. Finally, Man-
avi et al. [14] investigated the financial impact of imple-
menting the BT hospital policy. The results showed that
in 2011 and before the implementation of the policy,
public hospitals paid about 7026 billion rials for physi-
cians’ salaries and 8140 billion rials for hoteling costs,
with the implementation of the policy increasing these
costs by 15,669 and 12,212 billion rials respectively.
Therefore, it was estimated that the full implementation
of the BT hospital policy would require an additional 28,
000 billion rials that should be somehow financed by the
MOHME and insurance organizations.
Independent hospital policy
In April 2018, the MOHME issued the independent hos-
pital administration guidelines, a modified version of the
hospital autonomization plan that sought to address its
problems. These guidelines were drafted by the Manage-
ment Structure and Technology Committee of the
MOHME in line with article 2 of the Financial and
Transactional Bylaw of Universities and Faculties of
Medical Sciences. According to the MOHME, the goals
of this plan were continuous improvement in quality of
care, higher productivity, timely provision of services,
and increased patient satisfaction while limiting govern-
ment control. One of the most commonly cited draw-
backs of the hospital autonomization plan was the
unbalanced attention given to its different dimensions.
The guidelines for independent hospital administration
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address all the dimensions of autonomization in a bal-
anced manner. Once these guidelines were communi-
cated in 2018, 60 hospitals announced their readiness to
participate in this process based on a predefined set of
conditions and criteria. Of these, 35 hospitals, including
all the hospitals affiliated with Iran University of Medical
Sciences, were selected as targets for policy implementa-
tion. Later, however, the resignation of the Minister of
Health and subsequent political changes (including
changes in the advocates of the policy) coupled with ad-
verse macroeconomic conditions resulted in the termin-
ation of this initiative [31, 32].
Hospital corporatization policy in Iran
Among Upstream Documents, hospital corporatization has
been mentioned in paragraph C of Article 88 of the Fourth
Development Plan [29]. Unlike other organizational re-
forms that have been implemented in hospitals affiliated
with the MOHME, the hospital corporatization policy is
spearheaded by the SSO. Similar to the MOHME, the SSO
has implemented various hospital organizational reforms in
response to internal and external challenges. One of these
attempts was to have SSO-affiliated hospitals governed by a
board of trustees. This policy was proposed and approved
in late 2000. According to this policy, a board of trustees
would be nominated by the SSO with relative authority to
manage the hospitals. The 2002 budget agreement antici-
pated the implementation of this policy in six hospitals, and
the number of these hospitals increased in 2004 and 2005.
Despite the announcement of the members of the boards
of trustees, practically none of the hospitals seriously en-
tered the implementation phase of the policy.
The SSO initiated the first instance of hospital
corporatization by transferring the control of Sadr Hos-
pital to Hekmat Medical Group in 1993. The establish-
ment of Milad Hospital as the largest hospital affiliated
with the SSO and running it as a commercial institution
with an independent board of directors was another at-
tempt to improve hospital governance. The hospital
corporatization policy involved the transfer of hospitals
to independent corporations that were established for
that purpose. This policy was first reflected in the provi-
sions of the SSO’s 2006 budget and later emphasized in
its 2007 and 2008 budgets. However, only Alborz Hos-
pital was corporatized and five other hospitals failed to
implement the policy. The provisions of the 2010 budget
called for the termination of the policy except for Alborz
Hospital. In the same year, the BT hospital policy was
once again placed on the agenda and was approved in
the 1388th meeting of SSO’s board of directors. Subse-
quently, a draft of bylaws for running hospitals by board
of trustees was prepared by the Department of Treat-
ment of SSO, but it was not well received by other de-
partments. Due to widespread criticism, the Department
of Economy and Planning proposed hospital
corporatization policy [23].
Between 2013 and 2017, hospital corporatization was
more strongly promoted. During this period, an attempt
was made to run newly established hospitals as corpora-
tions. This trend continued with the establishment of
the 100-bed Abolfazl Abbas hospital in Birjand (Milad 3)
in 2015, the 36-bed Zagros Martyrs Hospital in Ilam
(Milad 4) and the 100-bed Amir Kabir Hospital in
Ahwaz (Milad 5) in 2017, and Amir Al- Momenin Hos-
pital in Khoy (Milad 6) in 2018. Based on the 2016 reso-
lution of SSO’s board of trustees and the 2017 resolution
of its board of directors for establishing a Healthcare
Holding, Milad-e-Salamat Institute was registered in
2017 and was authorized to administer the ordinary and
extraordinary general assemblies of the corporatized
hospitals [33].
In a study by Mohammadi et al. [27], 5 factors and 28
components that affect SSO’s Healthcare Holding were
identified, including strategic planning (4 components),
decision rights (6 components), financing (6 compo-
nents), monitoring and evaluation (5 components), and
accountability (7 components). Financing and monitor-
ing and evaluation were found to be the most important
factors.
In a report published by the Health Economics and
Planning Group [23], the performance of 3 corporate
and 69 non-corporate hospitals affiliated with the SSO
were compared in terms of efficiency, quality, access,
and accountability. Corporate hospitals had better per-
formance in terms of efficiency (BOR, BTR, ALOS, and
bed turnover interval). The revenue-to-cost ratio was
greater than 1 in all corporate hospitals, while in non-
corporate hospitals, only 58% of the costs were on aver-
age covered by the revenues. No significant difference
was observed between corporate and non-corporate hos-
pitals in patient satisfaction as a measure of quality of
care. In terms of accountability, the results showed that
the introduction of balance sheets and profit and loss
statements increased financial accountability in corpor-
ate firms. A review of corporate hospitals’ invoices and
records by the Office of Medical Records showed that
corporatization had indeed improved performance ac-
countability; however, the severed ties between these
hospitals and the Department of Treatment reduced ac-
countability in certain treatment and management areas.
In a research report by Azami-Aghdash [28], the per-
formance outcomes of 5 budgetary hospitals and 2 cor-
porate hospitals (Alborz and Sadr Hospitals) were
compared based on 49 performance indicators. In the
quantitative phase, the results showed better perform-
ance by budgetary hospitals in some indicators and by
corporate hospitals in other indicators, and overall, the
differences were not statistically significant. In the
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qualitative phase, 26 weaknesses and 12 strengths were
identified for budgetary hospitals as the dominant gov-
ernance structure. This study recommended maintaining
the current structure while suggesting various changes
and reforms to improve it. Some of these reforms in-
cluded changes in payment and human resource man-
agement systems and in management structure by
creating a board called the “High Decision Making
Board” that would consist of 8 administrative and clin-




Table 4 provides a summary of organizational hospital
reforms in Iran based on Preker and Harding’s spectrum
along with the start and end dates of each policy, hospi-
tals included in each policy, related studies, and key
findings. Studies have shown that the hospital autonomi-
zation policy has failed to achieve its main objectives, i.e.
to improve efficiency and quality. Unbalanced and para-
doxical autonomization, limited decision rights regarding
human, physical, and financial resources as well as stra-
tegic management, maintaining the bureaucratic struc-
ture of the hospitals instead of participatory structures
such as board of directors and board of trustees, unsus-
tainable funding, lack of alignment between autonomiza-
tion reforms and financing and payment reforms, lack of
evidence-based policymaking and dearth of research on
hospital autonomization years after its implementation,
ideological focus and the disregard for the context of the
policy, and poor governance arrangements are the most
important reasons for the failure of the hospital autono-
mization policy in Iran. In terms of financing, the main
barriers to the success of this policy were unrealistic tar-
iffs in the public sector and higher tariffs in the private
sector, the prevalence of unethical activities such as
under-the-table payments to health care providers and
the subsequent hand-picking of patients, linear instead
of global budget allocation, the inefficient fee-for-service
payment system, and the fact that some hospitals were
not the sole residual claimant, while others were subsi-
dized by the MOHME [10, 11, 12, 17, 19, 20].
Although the implementation of the BT hospital policy
was a step forward, it was hindered by the same prob-
lems that led to the failure of the hospital autonomiza-
tion policy. The BT hospital policy was also
implemented in an unbalanced manner and some of its
key aspects were overlooked [21, 26]. This policy trans-
formed the bureaucratic structure of hospitals into the
more modern and participatory structure of the board of
trustees. The hospitals were autonomous in theory, but
various studies showed that this autonomy was limited
by a variety of factors, including the appointment of the
university chancellor as the chair of the board and the
key decision making authority [18], the insignificant role
of the other board members, the lack of a specific
process for decision making, and the strong presence
and political pressure of lobbyists and interest groups
[24], absence of civil societies such as municipalities and
governorates in board sessions [16], and centrally im-
posed constraints on human resource management by
hospitals [21], and the government still maintains its au-
thority in BT hospitals.
Unsustainable financing and inefficient payment sys-
tems have been cited in most studies of BT hospitals as
critical factors in the failure of the policy. Lack of com-
mitment on the part of insurance organizations to cover
the agreed-upon tariffs due to the heavy financial burden
of BT hospitals, delayed payments by insurance organi-
zations [18, 21], the delayed announcement of new tar-
iffs by the MOHME, and the resulting financial burden
[14, 18], and unrealistic tariffs [13] are some of the is-
sues highlighted in various studies. Setting tariffs should
be based on scientific principles, evidence, and actual
costs to increase motivation and competitiveness in the
healthcare market and preventing destructive phenom-
ena such as dual practice of physicians, referring patients
to private hospitals, and wide income gap between pri-
vate and public sector physicians. Revision of the hos-
pital tariff system to increase hospitals’ revenues and
financial independence, and shifting from retrospective
to prospective and mixed payment systems are among
the other parallel reforms that can be done to improve
financing and payment system at the macro level.
Poor interaction with key stakeholders such as insur-
ance organizations, the MOHME and the High Insur-
ance Council are other factors that contribute to
unsustainable funding and hinder the implementation of
the policy. In one study, the interviewees attributed the
failure of the BT hospital policy to the lack of support
from insurance organizations. Therefore, good inter-
action between purchasers, providers, and governing
bodies has been considered a critical factor in the suc-
cess of this policy [21].
Lack of evidence-based policymaking and the disre-
gard for the context of the policy [20], the inappropriate
structure of the board of trustees, including the number
of board members, board composition, and irregular
board sessions [18], inefficient governance and regula-
tory arrangements, including vague implementation
laws, non-compliance, and poor accountability struc-
tures [18, 21, 26], and quality and quantity of human re-
sources [26] are other reasons for the failure of BT
hospitals to achieve their goals. Organizational reform
increases the authority of hospital managers at various
levels, and based on the concept of Tom Busert
decision-making space [34], managers can use these
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granted authorities to innovate and improve hospital ef-
ficiency if they have the necessary qualifications and
competencies, while hospital managers did not have
such characteristics. The results of quantitative studies,
though not generalizable in terms of methodology and
number of samples, have not been suggestive of the suc-
cess of BT hospitals compared to budgetary hospitals.
Hospital corporatization is the most important reform
in hospitals affiliated with the SSO. The key point in
hospital corporatization reforms is the lack of scientific
evidence regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of the
policy years after its implementation. The low number
of hospitals examined in one study and the unreliable
methods used to compare efficiency in another study
render their results insufficient for decision making. In
another study, SSO’s Healthcare Holding, which is the
ownership entity that coordinates corporate hospitals,
was studied and corporate hospitals were not directly ex-
amined. Studies conducted on this policy have men-
tioned financing, monitoring and evaluation, and
changes in payment and human resource management
systems as the most important factors affecting the
Healthcare Holding governance and corporate hospitals.
Poor governance mechanisms, weak internal controls,
low commitment to corporate governance, and poor
regulatory arrangements are among the possible reasons
for the failure of this policy, but further research is
needed.
Knowledge gaps in the literature on organizational
hospital reforms
A review of the literature on organizational hospital re-
forms reveals that, despite many years being passed after
their implementation, no studies were conducted on the
hospital autonomization policy (only two studies 13 years
after its implementation) and the hospital corporatization
policy (only one study 22 years after its implementation),
which would have helped to draw lessons from and im-
prove these policies. It is necessary to conduct research in
tandem with the implementation of reforms and use evi-
dence to improve policies. The limited number of studies
in this area have focused on two or several hospitals in a
short period of time and their results are not generalizable.
Most studies have used a few indicators for comparison,
and one study that uses a variety of indicators only exam-
ines 2 out of 7 corporate hospitals. Using reliable analyt-
ical techniques such as data envelopment analysis for
measuring the relative efficiency of a set of decision mak-
ing units (DMUs) with multiple inputs and multiple out-
puts and logistic regression for examining autonomization
historical data allows for a more accurate and reliable in-
vestigation of policy outcomes.
Qualitative studies have mainly focused on the reasons
for the failure of a given policy or barriers to its effective
implementation, and, to our knowledge, there are no
studies or reports examining other components of these
policies such as the structure, size, and composition of
the board, regulatory arrangements, accountability
mechanisms, and performance reporting. Monitoring
and evaluation of policies to draw lessons from their
outcomes and improve them have been largely over-
looked in Iran.
Conclusions
Various studies have shown that organizational hospital
reforms in Iran have not been implemented in a bal-
anced and proper manner. The bureaucratic structure of
hospitals was changed to participatory, but in practice,
these hospitals are still controlled by the government in
various ways instead of indirect control such as regula-
tory arrangements, budget management, procurement,
auditing, and performance evaluation. In most studies,
unsustainable financing and inefficient payment systems
have been cited as the most important reasons for the
failure of these policies.
As shown by Preker and Harding [1], organizational
reforms must take place parallel to other reforms, espe-
cially those related to financing and payment systems.
Hence, successful reforms in Iran require evidence-based
consideration of the external policy environment of the
hospitals, including regulatory and funding arrangements,
and the market environment, as changes in these elements
affect hospital autonomy and their ability to contribute to
the successful implementation of reforms. Studies con-
ducted in Iran support this hypothesis. Most of these stud-
ies have shown that unsustainable financing is the main
reason for the failure of various hospital reforms, which is
itself the result of problems related to setting tariffs, ineffi-
cient payment systems, absence of strategic purchasing,
and strong conflicts of interest among policymaking
institutions.
In addition, some studies have shown that poor inter-
action with stakeholders, failure to consider the context
of the health system, and lack of evidence-based policy-
making are critical factors that hinder the success of
organizational hospital reforms in Iran. Successful imple-
mentation of a policy in one country does not by itself
guarantee its success in another country. Contextual fac-
tors and the structure of the health system, its content,
and stakeholders must be taken into account in the de-
velopment, implementation, and evaluation of a policy,
and the policymaking process must be evidence-based
so that policies are started on the right track. Dearth of
methodological and timely studies on the impact of pol-
icies and achievement of their intended goals was a
major problem that specifically arose in the area of hos-
pital autonomization and corporatization policies and
must be addressed by policymakers. These studies can
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draw lessons from the past and help improve future
policies.
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